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Abstract 
 
We present a stylized intertemporal forward-looking model able that accommodates key 
regional economic features, an area where the literature is not well developed. The main 
difference, from the standard applications, is the role of saving and its implication for the 
balance of payments. Though maintaining dynamic forward-looking behaviour for agents, the 
rate of private saving is exogenously determined and so no neoclassical financial adjustment 
is needed. Also, we focus on the similarities and the differences between myopic and forward-
looking models, highlighting the divergences among the main adjustment equations and the 
resulting simulation outcomes.   
 
JEL classification: C68; D58; D91; R10 
 
Keywords: Myopic and Forward-looking Behaviour; Computable General Equilibrium 
Models; Regional Adjustment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Regional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models solve complex optimization 
problems within individual time periods in order to determine a complete allocation of a 
region’s resources between alternative uses. However, such models often lack forward-
looking expectations and this has been presented as a weakness (Partridge and Rickman, 
1998; 2010). In this paper we attempt to identify how significant the lack of forward looking 
expectations is in this setting. In particular, we build a stylized forward-looking CGE model 
applicable in a regional context. Results from simulations using this model are then compared 
to those from a similar model where the adjustment processes between periods have a myopic, 
backward-looking, recursive-dynamic structure.   
 
In this comparison of results we find the simulation differences are small. The long-run 
equilibria are identical. Furthermore, the adjustment paths generated by the two models are 
not radically different. We suggest two possible reasons why the importance of incorporating 
forward-looking expectations into regional CGE models might have been overstated. First, in 
previous comparisons using national models, the fully dynamic forward-looking model has 
often been compared to either a static model or one with passive investment. Second, the 
usual mechanism and closures that are applied in national inter-temporal CGE models 
misrepresent the adjustment mechanisms that typically occur within an individual region.  
 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a 
background discussion of the theoretical issues. In Section 3 we outline the model structure. 
In Section 4 we deal with the calibration method. In Section 5 we present the simulation 
strategy and in Section 6 we discuss the simulation results. We conclude in Section 7. 
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2. Background  
 
The theoretical structure of many intertemporal forward-looking CGE models is that 
described in Abel and Blanchard (1983). Such a model can be solved as a decentralized 
economy where consumption decisions are made by intertemporal optimizing households, 
with savings and investment decisions separated. Financial balance equilibrium is maintained 
through adjustment of either foreign borrowing, the interest rate, or by means of fiscal policy 
that, in turn, affects the financial wealth of households. Firms’ forward-looking behaviour 
influences their investment decisions which depend on the tax-adjusted Tobin’s q. 
Furthermore, in their stylized form, such models usually make households fully liable for the 
financial needs of the system. Hence, household savings would cover not only the needs of 
domestic investment, but also, ultimately, trade and Government deficits. Accordingly, 
households have to save as much as is required to clear the financial sector which, in turn, 
implies the imposition of a balance of payments constraint.  
 
In fact, forward-looking models are frequently calibrated on national data and their 
specification is nowadays becoming standardized. Their key characteristics are summarized in 
the first column of Table 1. However, the application of model specifications that imply a 
zero balance of payments and a savings rate obtained endogenously through financial balance 
equilibrium, may be inappropriate in a regional context since regions are likely to differ from 
the country as a whole in a number of significant respects.  
 
It is widely recognised that regions are more open than nations and that regional economies 
typically do not have the full range of macroeconomic policy levers (and many regions have 
none at all). Both monetary and fiscal policy are centralized and are under the control of 
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national Government so that policy instruments and some macroeconomic adjustment 
mechanisms, whose incorporation is uncontroversial in a national model, cannot routinely be 
assumed to apply to the case of a region
1
. Furthermore, regions, unlike nations, do not face a 
binding balance of payments constraint. There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, the 
balance of payments is not required as a policy target since regions usually belong to a 
common currency area and to a nationally integrated financial system. As a result, fiscal and 
monetary policies cannot be used to produce balance of payments adjustments through control 
variables such as exchange rates, reserve assets and interest rates. Secondly, the subvention 
that regions receive from higher level authorities, such as centralized Government and the EU, 
may cause some distortionary effects so that a rigorous theory of the composition of the 
balance of payments is not really a regional issue. As pointed out by McGregor et al (1995), 
such subventions are key determinants of the regional trade deficits. As long as national 
governments are credibly committed to the maintenance of the monetary union, regions do 
not face binding balance of payments constraints. In the UK context, for example, it is well-
known that Northern Ireland has over many years maintained a balance of payments (and 
public sector) deficit that would be unsustainable for a national economy. But the UK 
government is committed to the union and essentially underwrites this position.
2
 
 
The point is that forward-looking models impose balance of payments equilibrium in order to 
maintain financial sector sustainability, but regions are not obliged to undergo this form of 
financial adjustment. For instance, if a region faces an unsustainable position in which a net 
foreign debt is accompanied by a persistent trade deficit, it is not required to adopt rigorous 
adjustment in order to produce a trade surplus to cover interest payments because there is no 
                                                          
1
Even though some nations are likely to behave as regions (European countries for example). 
2
 This does not threaten the sustainability of UK public finances because Northern Ireland accounts for only 2% 
of UK GDP. 
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superior authority to impose it. A superior institution such as central Government, may reduce 
the subvention to reduce its level of debt and, in turn, the region’s implicit (unobservable) 
debt. However, this is a process that occurs outside the region. It implies that any adjustment 
is imposed exogenously, from outside the region; it does not operate as an automatic, 
endogenous adjustment mechanism. This also means that the Ricardian implication of the 
fiscal deficit which is usually embedded in consumers’ optimal decisions might be unrealistic; 
typically a regional (i.e. sub-national) Government which has no significant devolution of tax 
or borrowing powers, cannot finance its expenditure by levying taxes or issuing bonds. In this 
context regional policy is exogenous to the region, reflecting the subvention received from 
outside the region.    
 
Of course, given widespread movement towards greater devolution within the EU, more 
regions will be given the responsibility, and be equipped with the corresponding instruments, 
to deal with the reduction in subventions, thereby introducing specific sustainable targets that 
might bring about a partial endogenous financial adjustment operating within the region. 
However, only when regions start to behave like countries belonging to a common currency 
area, e.g. the European countries, does the balance of payments begin to be a matter at the 
regional level, and any adjustment in internal and foreign assets ceases to be exogenously 
determined. However, this does not necessarily imply that the traditional approach to the 
balance of payments becomes appropriate. Even in this case, and for such regions, it may be 
inappropriate to impose full interregional and international payments constraints. 
 
Our view is that in a regional intertemporal model, the treatment of internal and external debt 
should differ from the usual application in a corresponding national model. Thus, in a stylized 
regional model, Government and external debt, with their correspondent internal and external 
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deficit flows, should not be involved in the process that determines financial adjustment 
within the region. This also means that the role of savings should differ from that played in 
standard applications. In a region, the household savings decisions are independent of the 
regional financial system. In fact, such decisions are more likely to be affected by national 
adjustment which is, of course, exogenous in a single small, open regional economy model.  
 
The intertemporal model developed in this paper maintains forward-looking behaviour for 
both households and firms, and investment and saving decisions are kept separate. However, 
unlike standard applications, in our formulation savings follow the Solow-Swan assumption 
so that the rate of savings is exogenous. This does not prevent the absolute level of savings 
from varying through time. The key characteristics of this model are summarised in the final 
column of Table 1. 
 
We compare simulation results from myopic and forward-looking models. Under particular 
circumstances, we find that both models produce the same long-run steady state equilibrium. 
This outcome differs from those reported in the existing literature (e.g., Go, 1994; Devarajan 
and Go, 1998 ) where the long-run impact differs in both models. Major concern over 
incorporating forward-looking expectations has arisen when the policy to be evaluated has 
intrinsic long-run effects (as in trade liberalization policy, for example). Go (1994) and 
Devarajan and Go (1998) argue that myopic models fail to capture dynamic policy gains and, 
consequently, produce both inaccurate and incorrect results. For example, Devarajan and Go 
(1998) claim to demonstrate that the welfare gains of eliminating trade tariffs are greater in 
forward-looking models than in static models
3
.  
                                                          
3
 Also see Dellink (2005) on environmental policy.   
8 
 
However, the underlying reason for these results is related, as we explain later, to the 
asymmetric model specifications incorporated in both models. Indeed, it would seem that the 
intertemporal forward-looking model has generally been compared to the simple static case 
that lacks any optimal capital adjustment rule, so that investment is either crudely assumed 
fixed to the base year level or is passive. The characteristics of this model are summarised in 
column 2 of Table 1. Consequently, myopic and forward-looking models have produced 
results that differ even in the long-run. In our approach we find the same long-run equilibrium 
for comparable myopic and the forward-looking models, although the transitional paths differ.  
Independently of the dynamic structure, forward-looking and myopic regional models should 
incorporate a separate investment function and the investment decision must be determined 
independently of the savings decision.  
 
The myopic model used in this example, which follows the usual AMOS closures (McGregor 
et al 1995, 1996), allows investment to respond to the current rate of return to capital (column 
3 of Table 1). In addition the analysis is enriched by assuming labour supply adjustment 
through migration, and by investigating the role of different labour market closures. CGE 
models based on myopic expectations have been criticised by the supporters of forward-
looking models because of the intertemporal inconsistency involved in assuming backward-
looking expectations. The models solve complex optimization problems within periods in 
order to determine the best allocation of resources. However, between periods they remain 
myopic, with consumption, saving and investment decisions abstracting from future periods 
(Devarajan and Go, 1998). We argue in this paper that such differences are the result of the 
different adjustment mechanisms incorporated into these models and not, in fact, the 
consequence of assuming myopia as against perfect foresight.  
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We proceed by specifying illustrative regional intertemporal (column 4) and myopic (column 
3) models, calibrating them to a common database, and subjecting them to an identical 
disturbance. This allows us to conduct a systematic comparison of their simulation properties, 
and thereby isolate the significance of the distinction between myopic and forward looking 
regional models. 
 
Furthermore, in order to clarify the significance of our particular assumptions about the nature 
of regional adjustment processes, we also develop both forward looking and myopic regional 
models that share key characteristics of the national models identified in Table 1. In 
particular, we impose a regional balance of payments constraint and saving behaviour that 
makes regional households responsible for financial equilibrium. By calibrating these models 
to the same database and subjecting them to the same disturbance as our preferred 
specifications for regional models, we can reveal the true source of key model properties. This 
allows us to identify the significance of alternative assumptions about macroeconomic 
processes, as well as alternative assumptions about expectations formation, for the properties 
of models of regional economies. 
 
3. Model Description 
 
A single-region dynamic CGE model is presented in this section. The complete mathematical 
representation is provided in Appendix A (A.1 - A.77).  
 
Parameterisation is implemented through the well-known calibration method using a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Sardinia for the year 2001 (Ferrari et al., 2009). The set of 
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prices at which excess demand is zero is the result of an optimization process where market 
clearing prices equal marginal costs in each sector. 
 
Three economic activities or sectors are considered: Primary, Manufacturing and Services. No 
distinction is made between traded and non-traded sectors. Sardinia is a very small open 
economy and almost all sectors compete in interregional and international markets. Even 
health care services, traditionally a sheltered sector, are now inter-regionally traded. 
Production inputs include primary factors and intermediate purchases. The model includes 
three domestic institutional sectors: Firms, Households and Government. External institutions 
are split into the Rest of Italy (ROI) and Rest of the World (ROW). We adopt assumptions 
typically used for a small open economy. The region is too small to affect prices in 
international and interregional markets and, as a consequence, the ROI and ROW prices are 
taken to be exogenous. The behaviour of Households and Firms is based on intertemporal 
optimization with perfect foresight. Government is a consolidated sector merging central and 
local Government levels whose expenditure can be either the result of an optimization 
process, where Government is simply treated as a new consumer maximizing utility subject to 
the budget constraints, or it is held constant in real terms.   
 
Production. The model’s production structure is illustrated in Figure 1. Intermediate inputs 
(VV), labour (L) and capital (K) constitute the production inputs of the model. L and K are 
combined in a CES production function in order to produce value added, Y, allowing for 
substitution among primary factors of production (A.17). The demand for L and K is obtained 
from the first order condition of profit maximization. This implies that the demand for both K 
and L is positively related to the volume of value added, Y, and is a decreasing function of 
their prices (rk and w, respectively). Leontief technology between VV and Y is imposed 
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(A.14), so the combination of value added and intermediate inputs can be shown with an L-
shaped isoquant. Intermediate goods produced locally or imported are considered as imperfect 
substitutes. Basically, we mix regional and imported goods under the so called Armington 
assumption through a CES function. The demand function for regionally produced and 
imported intermediate inputs (from ROI and ROW) derives from the solution of a cost 
minimization problem (A.19-A.22). Regional commodities supply is bought by industries and 
by domestic and external institutions (A.24). That is to say, each industry in the region 
produces goods and services that can be exported or sold in the regional market. An export 
demand function closes the model where the foreign demand for Sardinian goods depends on 
the terms of trade effect and on the export price elasticity (A.23).  
 
Investment. This follows Hayashy (1982) with the rate of investment as a function of marginal 
q (or average q)
4
, the ratio of the value of firms (VF) to the replacement cost of capital Pk∙K. 
With adjustment costs that are quadratic in investment, the economy does not adjust 
instantaneously to the desired level of capital stock. Accordingly, firms respond to the shock 
by making continuous small investments over time. The dynamic path of investment is the 
result of an intertemporal programme that seeks to maximize VF subject to the capital 
accumulation equation,  ̇, (A.50). The value of firms, VF, is given by the present value of the 
net income or cash flow, CF, that is to say, the capital income    less investment expenditure 
    . The investment expenditure equation (A.45) is defined as a function of the adjustment 
cost  (  ) (A.48) as in Devarajan and Go (1998), Go (1994) and Hayashi (1982). The 
                                                          
4
 As we are assuming that the firm is price taker, the marginal q is equal to the average q. For more detail see 
Hayashy (1982).  
 
12 
 
solution to this intertemporal problem
5
 produces the time path of investment (A.46) along 
with the law of motion of the costate variable   (A.47). 
 
Consumption. Individuals optimise their lifetime utility function of consumption, C (A.26) 
subject to a lifetime wealth.  Once the optimal path of consumption is obtained from the 
solution of the intertemporal problem (A27), aggregate consumption is allocated within each 
period and between different groups through a CES function (A.34). Household demand for 
regional and imported goods (A.35 and A.36) is the result of the intra-temporal cost 
minimization problem. According to the dynamic budget constraint, the discounted present 
value of consumption must not exceed total household wealth, W. The model distinguishes 
between financial wealth (FW) and non-financial wealth (NFW). So total Wealth, W, is given 
by: 
 
            (1) 
 
The NFW accumulate as follow: 
 
    (    )             (2) 
 
                                                          
5
 The optimality conditions (or the canonic system which gives the system of differential equations in the 
optimal control problem) are given by the first order condition of the Hamiltonian in current value: 
 
A. 
  
  
      (  )     
B.  ̇   
  
  
     ̇  (    )     
  
C.                (trasversality condition) 
 
The canonic system [A, B and C] can be solved to yield the costate variable in terms of discounted future 
revenue of capital which in turn leads to equation (5). More detail about the dynamic solution can be found in Go 
(1994) and Devarajan and Go (1998).  
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where     is the net labour income plus transfers of income from internal and external 
institutions.  FW, unlike in the standard applications, is accumulated through saving, S as 
follows: 
 
   (    )              (3) 
and  
            (4) 
 
where    is capital income,     is total household current income (that is,       ) whilst 
mps is a parameter calibrated from the SAM. This way of proceeding, although allowing us to 
deal with an exogenous rate of household saving, is wholly consistent with forward-looking 
consumption behaviour. In fact, consumption still depends on lifetime income. That is to say, 
consumers base consumption decisions on expected future income even thought now, saving 
is not affected by investment and from the current account situation.  
 
In the traditional approach, financial wealth is obtained by assuming asset equilibrium so that 
financial wealth accumulates according to the following: 
 
   (    )           (∑     
 
       ) (5) 
 
where FD is the fiscal deficit and TB is the trade balance. Then  ∑                gives us 
endogenous saving which replaces equation (2). This means that household financial wealth is 
equal to total assets, internal and external. That is to say: 
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    ∑            
 
 (6) 
 
In others words the wealth derived from asset holdings consists of the value of firms (VF), 
public assets (GD) and foreign assets (D). The value of firms represents the wealth generated 
from assets that consist of domestic firms’ shares. Foreign assets reflect holdings of foreign 
firms’ shares. The value of public assets is derived from Government bonds issued to finance 
the fiscal deficit.  
 
In this formulation, as described in equation (3) and (4), the balance of payments still clears 
and we do not need to impose any balance of payments adjustment because the total 
absorption equation is sufficient to guarantee equilibrium in the payments account since we 
are not considering money as a commodity. In contrast, implicit in equation (5) is the 
imposition of a balance of payments adjustment because savings are determined 
endogenously according to the financial needs of the regional system. This method is 
incoherent if a regional context is considered. As we have said in the introduction, it is 
plausible that the regional savings rate depends very much on the national economy and, 
unlike countries there is no saving-investment association. Furthermore, regions are unlikely 
to face a balance of payments problem because the multiregional capital market is highly 
integrated and capital moves freely across regions.  
 
In other intertemporal models household savings have also been determined as a fixed share 
of income, as for instance in Go, (1994). He exploits Abel’s and Blanchard’s (1983) 
equivalence to delete the household budget constraint, solving the model as a centralized 
economy but imposing financial sector equilibrium and making foreign borrowing 
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endogenous. We can also run the model as a master plan, not considering the motion equation 
of the state variable W (see Section 4). 
 
Domestic private Assets. From Hayashi’s (1982) work we know that if the firm is a price 
taker, then marginal q is equal to average q. Therefore we can specify the shadow price of 
capital    as the ratio of the value of the firm VF to its capital stock K (A.59).  
 
Foreign and public assets. The common hypothesis is that both internal and external debt 
accumulates over time in accordance with the level of deficit and interest payments. 
Moreover, terminal conditions for assets are imposed in order to avoid Ponzi games. As many 
CGEs are calibrated on steady state equilibrium, the need to maintain a sustainable position 
may generate a dataset that does not reflect the real situation of the region. For instance, the 
calibration of the foreign asset/debt is derived by imposing regional sustainability with respect 
to foreign creditors or debtors. In doing this, if the regional SAM registers a trade deficit, we 
need to impose (and suppose) that, in the past, the region has run in surplus for many years in 
order to accumulate assets; the presence of a trade surplus should imply foreign debt. But 
several regions are in a permanent Ponzi game condition. If we do not take this situation into 
account, the quantitative nature of the results may change. So, if foreign debt accumulates 
according to the following:  ̇          and the trade balance TB is positive (so a trade 
deficit), a sustainable long-run position should require interest-bearing foreign assets held by 
the private sector. Alternatively, a negative TB (trade surplus) in the long-run would be able to 
cover interest payments on any outstanding foreign debt. In a regional context we may 
suppose, instead, those capital inflows necessary to cover the trade deficit are partially 
constituted by subvention on which no interest is paid and that, therefore, will not reduce 
internal assets because these are resources coming free of charge. In Sardinia’s case, trade 
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deficits exist on both interregional and international side. Sardinia is a region that receives 
extensive capital subvention from the EU and the Italian Government: any payments from the 
Social or Structural funds of the EU are matched by the National Government. Such capital 
inflows are free of charge and not determined by the desire of an investor to acquire Sardinia 
assets. In this case the change in debt that may affect the sector financial balance should be 
net of this capital inflow. In modelling this situation we may assume that a proportion of 
debt,   , is the amount of subvention that the region receives from the National Government or 
EU, and not because there is the desire to invest in the region:  
 
 ̇  (   )       (7) 
 
So the debt accumulates only if     (   )   and the net foreign debt is equal to the 
gross debt less the accumulated subvention on the assets in the gross debt. 
As regards Government debt or assets, because Sardinia has an internal deficit, according to 
the usual calibration that imposes sustainability of fiscal deficits, we would need to suppose 
the presence of Government assets which reduce the total assets available for private agents. 
However for the same reasons, as explained above, we consider an “unsustainable” position 
as one in which the debt is going to accumulate net of the resources that the region receives 
from outside of the region (A.62).  
 
Labour market regimes and labour supply. The model incorporates three labour market 
closures reflecting the form of wage setting: regional wage bargaining (RB), national 
bargaining (NB) and fixed real wage, (FRW). The wage-setting functions are defined below, 
where w is the nominal wage, cpi is the consumer price index,    is a parameter calibrated to 
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the steady state and u is the regional unemployment rate.    is the elasticity of wages related to 
the level of unemployment rate and it can also be interpreted as an index of wage flexibility. 
 
            
{
 
 
 
   [
  
    
]       (  )  (                   )
  
    
 
    
      
               (              )
 
                                  (                   )
 (8) 
 
In the regional wage bargaining regime, the labour market is defined by the wage curve 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) according to which wages and unemployment are 
negatively related
6. Thus regional wages are directly related to workers’ bargaining power and 
respond to excess demand for labour. NB is a typical Keynesian closure. It assumes that the 
nominal wage is fixed at the base year level. This could be motivated by a system in which 
the nominal wage is fixed at the national level by the presence of a nation-wide bargaining 
system (Harrigan et al., 1991). FRW is used to obtain an alternative counterfactual analysis, 
reflecting a “real-wage-resistance” hypothesis, where bargaining ensures that the purchasing 
power of wages remains stable over time.  
 
As regards demographic developments and labour supply, we assume that there is no natural 
population change, but the labour force adjusts through a migration model commonly 
employed in AMOS (Harrigan et al.1996, McGregor at al. 1996). The migration model 
assumes the form specified in Layard et al. (1991) and Treyz et al. (1993) where the net 
migration flow is taken to be positively related to the gap between the log of regional and 
national ( w
N
/cpi
N
 ) real wages, and negatively related to the difference between the log of 
regional and national, (u
N
), unemployment rates: 
                                                          
6
 See application of this closure in McGregor et al. 1995 and 1996. 
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 [  (  )     ( ̅
 )]     *  (
  
    
)    (
 ̅ 
   ̅̅ ̅̅  
)+ ( 9 ) 
 
where nim is the rate of net migration and    is a parameter calibrated in order to ensure zero 
net migration in the base period.    and    are elasticities that measure the impact of the gap 
between the logs of regional and national unemployment and real wage rates. 
 
4. Calibration 
 
The model calibration process assumes the economy to be initially in steady state equilibrium. 
The parameters of the models are obtained from the SAM by means of the usual calibration 
method. Since, in a deterministic approach, some of the parameters remain unspecified, we 
need to find them from outside the model, so the elasticities of substitution and other 
behavioural parameters are based on econometric estimation or best guesses. For all sectors, 
trade elasticities are set equal to 2 whilst production elasticities are equal to 0.3. The wage 
curve elasticity is set to -0.033, following to a recent econometric estimation reported in 
Devicienti et al. (2008), whilst in the migration function     and    are set equal to -0.08 and 
0.06, respectively
7
. These elasticities are commonly used in AMOS and econometrically 
estimated by Layard et al. (1991).  
 
 
                                                          
7
 We are using parameters estimated on UK data. However this can be a good approximation for European 
countries. For example, the values of these parameters are almost double for the US economy (see Treyz et al. 
1993). 
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The values of adjustment cost parameters
8
   and    in equations (A.46-9) are assigned values 
0 and 1.5, respectively. The World interest rate is set to 0.04, the rate of depreciation to 0.07 
and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is equal to 1.5. Given the value of total 
investment, J, as supplied by the System of National Accounts (ISTAT, 2005) through the 
capital matrix
9
, KMi, j, the equality condition with total investment by origin in the SAM holds 
true. The price of capital goods, Pk, is set equal to unity since the benchmark prices on the 
consumption side are set equal to one. W corresponds to the discounted flow of current 
income, NFW to the discounted flow of net labour income, and FW is obtained by 
maintaining asset equilibrium. By imposing equality
10
 between the rate of return to capital rk 
and the user cost of capital
11
, uck,  from the constraint equations (A.28), A(.40), (A.45-49), 
(A59) and (A.62-67), we obtain consistent values for the variables I, K,   , W, NFW and FW. 
 
The model is solved by applying the usual procedure in solving an infinite time horizon 
model, by imposing steady state conditions at a specific point in time. In the first periods we 
impose factor constraints in order to identify short-run impact; however the transitional 
pathway is the result of the discrete time solution of the model
12
.  
 
                                                          
8
 In many applications the parameter   is set to zero. The value of  is set to 0.9 in Dissou (2002) in a model 
of Senegal and in Go (1994) and Devarajan and Go (1998) in their model of Philippine is set at 2. 
 
9
 For detail about the construction of the Sardinian capital matrix, see Garau and Lecca (2008). 
 
10
 The equality between rk and uck is necessary since we are proposing the same calibration method for the 
myopic and the intertemporal model.  
 
11
 Given that the interest rate and the depreciation rate are fixed, the user cost of capital depends on the variation 
of the capital good price, Pk.  
 
12
 The model is run simultaneously for 100 periods. Since we impose capacity constraints in the short-run and 
labour supply adjustment through migration with analysis of different wage setting, it may take longer for a 
steady state to be reached compare to conventional intertemporal CGE model that usually apply a vertical labour 
supply closure where wages are totally flexible and labour supply fixed.  
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The myopic model developed here, and which is compared with the intertemporal model, is 
not obtained recursively, rather the equations of the model are solved simultaneously for a 
given finite time horizon. Since the myopic model does not incorporate jumping variables the 
results correspond, of course, to those of the recursive one. In addition, the model 
incorporates an adjustment cost function through which investment is determined 
independently of savings. The adjustment rule introduced in the myopic model follows that 
employed in AMOS (McGregor et al., 1996) which is consistent with the neoclassical 
formulation developed in Jorgenson (1963) and Eisner-Stroz (1963); the optimal path of 
investment is derived through the accelerator mechanism  : 
 
    [    ] 
 
where    is the desired level of capital. This is wholly compatible with the Uzawa 
formulation of adjustment cost where the investment capital ratio ( ) is determined by the 
rate of return to capital (rk) and the user cost of capital (uck), allowing the capital stock to 
reach its desire level in a smooth fashion over time:  
 
   (      )     
   
 
  
   
     
  
    
       
 
Although Uzawa’s formulation and Tobin’s q theory are formally different, they are in 
essence “equivalent,” as noted in Hayashi13 (1982).  
 
                                                          
13
 This equivalence allows Hayashy to integrate the two theories deriving a rate of investment function of q. 
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The myopic model can also be run for two static conceptual time closures: the Short-Run 
(SR) and the Long-Run (LR). In the SR, capital and labour supplies are fixed at their base 
year values and the initial distribution across sectors is also maintained; in the LR, factor 
constraints are relaxed allowing for complete capital and labour adjustment. Capital stock is at 
its optimum level, with rental rates equal to user cost of capital. With regard to labour supply, 
the population is fully adjusted so that the system exhibits zero net migration. We also allow 
for perfect mobility across sectors. This kind of adjustment is quite similar to those reported 
in AMOS, a CGE for Scotland (McGregor et al., 1996). 
 
5. Simulation strategy 
 
We present several simulations in order to compare different forward-looking model 
specifications (which are declared by an FL prefix). Comparisons between forward-looking 
and myopic models (MYP prefix) are also carried out. In all simulations the disturbance takes 
the form of a 10% increase in interregional exports. We prefer a simple demand shock since 
this simplifies the analysis (and we do not focus here directly on policy issues), but its aim is 
to highlight the main differences that may arise by changing the dynamic structure of the 
model and some household closure rules.  
 
We present the proportionate changes from base year values for a set of key economic 
variables in Tables 2 and 3 for the intertemporal and myopic models, respectively. In the 
tables, only the short-run and long-run results are reported, along with outcomes related to the 
three labour market regimes: Regional Bargaining (RB), National Bargaining (NB) and Fixed 
Real Wage (FRW). We distinguish between models with fixed saving rate (FL1 and MYP1) 
and models where the saving rate is endogenous (FL2 and MYP2). The first case correspond 
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sto the model that closer to a regional economic system, while the second specification should 
be instead apply only in the national context. The main difference between the regional 
forward looking model (FL1) and its myopic counterpart (MYP1), and the forward looking 
(FL2) and myopic (MYP2) models run with national closure is in the financial adjustment 
process and its implication for the balance of payments.  
 
In FL1, we try to design a hypothetical stylized regional intertemporal model where 
household saving decisions do not involve any financial adjustment process. We are aware 
that this may change the nature of the intertemporal model. However, as we have explained 
above, in a regional economic framework it does not seems appropriate to incorporate 
household saving decisions in the manner usually applied in intertemporal models, as in 
equation (5).  
 
The outcomes obtained can also be replicated by running the model as a centralized solution 
by exploiting Abel’s and Blanchard’s equivalence (Abel and Blanchard, 1983). Such a 
solution has also been used in Go (1994) to remove the household budget constraint. As a 
result, this reduces the dimensions of the problem. Go (1994) thus closes the model by 
imposing equality between total savings and investment through adjustment in the level of 
foreign borrowing.  
 
However, this is not the method we use. We may exploit Abel’s and Blanchard’s (1983) 
equivalence to delete the motion equation of the state variable W and re-solve the problem as 
a centralized economy as in Go (1994), but without imposing financial sector equilibrium. 
This is consistent with a regional macroeconomic framework in which the constant savings 
rate (Solow-Swan assumption) does not involve an adjustment of the private sector financial 
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balance, as seen above. That is, regional private assets, Government and foreign borrowing do 
not take part in determining the consumer’s intertemporal decisions (compared with e.g. 
Devarajan and Go, 1998, Go, 1994 and Dissou, 2002).  
 
Such a specification does not prevent the consumer from behaving with perfect foresight. 
Indeed, consumers still take decisions on the basis of future wealth, preserving the condition 
of instability between current consumption and wealth during the transitional pathway. Of 
course, in the long-run, the trasversality condition is satisfied and stability restored. 
 
MYP1 represents the traditional myopic regional model. This model, as noted above, is quite 
similar to the type of adjustment present in AMOS (McGregor et al. 1996). Household 
savings are a fixed proportion of income and consumption is obtained from a simple budget 
constraint equation.  
 
The national configuration of the model is represented in FL2, where households are 
responsible for all of the financial needs of the regional system, so their financial wealth is 
related to outstanding foreign debt, the value of firms and Government debt. We are assuming 
that the Government is financing the debt by issuing bonds that are borne exclusively by 
households. In this case, the imposition of sectoral financial equilibrium is equivalent to the 
imposition of a balance of payments constraint which requires saving to adjust in order to 
satisfy the intertemporal payment constraint.  
 
In order to make a comparison with a myopic formulation, in MYP2 not only the balance of 
payment holds, moreover we attempt to emulate the same financial adjustment that would 
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occur in FL2. In doing so the household budget constraint equation and the financial balance 
equilibrium are included in the myopic model.  
 
All models are run in order to generate an endogenous updating of the working population 
through migration (see equation 9). Indeed, imperfect labour markets and labour supply 
adjustment obtained through the introduction of quantity signals (given by the unemployment 
rate), and migration, are key factors in regional economic models. Such elements make 
regional models different to their national counterparts where the wage is often fully flexible 
and labour supply is exogenous. 
 
6. Simulation results 
 
6.1. The long run impact: myopic vs. forward looking. 
 
From Tables 2 and 3 we immediately note that, in the long run, for all closures and in all 
cases we obtain Leontief-type results (see McGregor et al., 1996), characterized by changes in 
quantities but no change in prices. This reflects the complete adjustment of all factors of 
production. Indeed, both capital and labour endogenously adjust over time. Capital stock 
increases with investment which, in turn, is affected by its real shadow price. As aggregate 
demand rises, prices increase and so do firms’ profit expectations. This leads to an increase in 
investment that is moderated by the replacement cost of capital reflected in the real shadow 
price. In-migration increases in response to a rise in real wages and falling unemployment 
until, in the long run, the labour market is cleared and all the increase in employment is 
covered by the increase in working population. In turn, the growth in labour supply puts 
25 
 
downward pressure on wages until the labour market is in long-run equilibrium, in which the 
real wage is restored to its original level and goods’ prices adjust fully. 
 
From the tables we can also see that there are no differences in the long-run impact between 
myopic and forward-looking models (LR: FL1≡MYP1 and FL2≡MYP2). This equivalence 
arises because, in the myopic model, consumption is passive and results from the budget 
constraint. Its long-run value should equal that obtained in forward-looking models given that 
the transversality condition is satisfied, consequently eliminating divergences between current 
income and current consumption. On the investment side of the forward-looking model, the 
accumulation rate adjusts fully as Tobin’s q equalizes. Such a situation corresponds, in the 
myopic formulation, to a zero gap between desired and actual level of capital (if we adopt a 
Jorgenson-type adjustment) or that the change in the rate of return to capital equals that of the 
user cost of capital (if Uzawa-type adjustment is applied). 
 
6.2. Fixed saving rate.  
 
We begin by analysing simulation results from the regional forward looking model. As we are 
analysing models that embody three distinct labour market closures, the main differences 
between these models are driven by wage dynamics. However, wage behaviour affects results 
only in the short run and the transitional path since in the long run labour supply adjustment 
allows the economy to reach Leontief-type results. Under regional bargaining and in the first 
period, which corresponds to the short-run solution, the demand stimulus increases labour 
demand which reduces the unemployment rate by 1.34% increasing, as a consequence, the 
bargaining power of workers and so the real wage (0.05%). For the national bargaining case, 
the real wage is below its initial equilibrium (-0.91%). As workers cannot bargain wages 
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within the region, the increase in aggregate demand raises prices, thereby lowering the 
purchasing power of wages. In the fixed real wage scenario, the increase in the consumer 
price index increases the nominal wage by the same amount (1.11%).  
 
Given that in national bargaining (NB), workers cannot bargain for higher real wages, the rise 
in employment and the reduction in the unemployment rate occur more rapidly than for the 
regional bargaining and fixed real wage cases. Furthermore, as the price of goods adjusts 
according to the wage dynamic by making the supply smoothly responsive, the analysis of the 
transitional path suggests that the capacity to reach the new steady state faster will depend on 
the speed of price adjustment. In national bargaining, prices adjust faster than the other two 
labour market closures because nominal wages are fixed, implying less resistance to reaching 
their long-run equilibrium, as we can see from Figures 2 and 3. Note that the fall in the real 
wage in the short-run under national bargaining has stimulating effects on the economy. In 
particular, this stimulates investment, so the economy adjusts more quickly under this labour 
market closure. 
  
In the short-run, the increase in interregional exports is not enough to cover the rise in total 
imports. The total trade deficit increases and for all labour market closures the ROI trade 
deficit improves while the ROW deficit gets worse. This is happening as the exogenous 
increase in interregional exports raises competitiveness with respect to the Rest of Italy, but 
the augmented aggregate demand generates an increase in production that needs to be 
satisfied by increasing the demand for import goods. This is driven also by the increase in 
regional prices. The result is a substitution effect which lowers ROW exports and raises ROW 
imports.  
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In the long-run, as prices adjust back to their benchmark values, the terms of trade effect is 
nullified, generating a full (10%) adjustment in interregional exports and zero change in 
international exports. So, as imports are increasing to satisfy production needs, the 
international current account get worse, although generating a total positive effect (current 
account ROI+ROW, -3.14%) given that part of the interregional current account improves by 
17.87%. 
 
In the first period, household consumption increases only for the case of national bargaining 
(0.10%). For regional bargaining and fixed real wage closures the proportionate change is 
negative. This is the distinctive impact we would expect in an intertemporal model that 
incorporates permanent income type behaviour; it implies that when households make 
decisions on current consumption, they take into consideration their future earnings, thus 
creating instability between current income and current consumption. Such instability 
disappears in the long-run where the change in consumption equals the positive variation in 
total wealth (1.48%). 
 
Change in the real shadow price drives the impact on investment which rises in the short-run, 
settling in the long-run at a level of 2.03% higher than the initial steady state. The reason is 
that the increase in exports affects domestic goods prices, raising profit expectations for firms 
in every sector. Indeed, in the first period we see that the change in the shadow price of 
capital is greater than the change in the capital goods price. Furthermore, change in 
investment is greater in national bargaining than in the other labour market closures (J: 
NB>FRW>RB). The reason can be identified in the variation of the replacement cost of 
capital which is higher in regional bargaining (1.08%) and lower in national bargaining 
(0.86%). The national bargaining case is less sensitive to factor constraints because workers 
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do not have the power to re-establish their purchasing power ( the real wage falls by 0.91%) 
under centralized wage bargaining, leading to less upward pressure on the prices of 
consumption goods.  
 
With regard to sectoral impacts, all three sectors receive permanent benefits. Breaking down 
the commodity composition of total exports, although the primary sector makes up the 
smallest share of total exports, it seems to be the sector that has the largest proportionate gains 
in terms of real output and investment, both in the short-run and in the long-run. Since the 
policy analysed here is a simple demand side shock, the initial steady state coefficients matter 
for the long-run outcome. In fact, exports represent 28% of primary sector output compared to 
12% in Manufacturing and 2% in Services.  
 
By comparing the results with the myopic case we see that, as expected, they exhibit the same 
long-run equilibrium
14
. Furthermore, if we look at the GRP charts in Figure 4, we can see that 
the adjustment paths are very similar. Indeed, in both models investment is responsive to the 
rate of return to capital and its increase is tempered by adjustment costs. Usually, the 
intertemporal model is compared to the myopic model in which investment is passive and 
roughly determined by available savings expressed as a fixed share of income. Here instead, 
the behaviour of investment is quite similar in both the myopic and the forward-looking 
models. Furthermore, saving rate is fixed in both intertemporal and myopic cases.  
 
However, the transitional pathway towards the long-run may differ since, in the myopic 
model, agents’ expectations are based on the past, whilst in the forward-looking model both 
consumption and the shadow price of capital depend on future conditions.  In Figure 4, it can 
                                                          
14
 These results seem in contrast with Devarajan and Go (1998) where the static and the intertemporal model 
produce different results.   
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be seen that only for the cases of regional bargaining and fixed real wage does the forward 
looking model achieve the steady state equilibrium faster than its myopic counterpart.  
 
In Figure 5 we present the adjustment paths of those variables subject to forward-looking 
behaviour, namely consumption and investment.  In the regional bargaining case, only after 
the 30
th
 period does consumption in the intertemporal model exceed that in the myopic model. 
For investment, the forward looking model adjusts more rapidly than its myopic counterpart.  
 
These results, however, are strongly conditioned by the parameters of the models. In the 
myopic model, the adjustment parameter (which is applied to the gap between actual and 
desired level of capital stock) in the investment function, set to 0.5, is the major driver of the 
speed of adjustment; in the forward-looking model the speed of adjustment is particularly 
sensitive to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, here equal to 1.5, that generates 
consumer preferences between periods.  As we shall see in 6.4, it is not necessarily the case 
that the model with perfect foresight reaches long-run equilibrium faster than its myopic 
couterpart.   
 
6.3. Endogenous saving rate.  
 
When the saving rate is endogenous we are to some extent introducing an intertemporal 
constraint that leads to payments equilibrium through sectoral financial flows, and in turn, 
imposes a balance of payments adjustment constraint according to which savings depends on 
domestic and foreign financial assets. According to our experiment this has the effect of 
inverting the behaviour of saving in the short-run and raising the long-run impact of an 
increase in exports. 
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We do not find much difference with respect to the regional model configuration as far as the 
direction of the effect is concerned. This is true even for price adjustment, which seems quite 
similar to the FL1 scenario, as does the impact of different labour market closures. The price 
of domestic goods drives up the increase in the consumption price and the capital goods price. 
Price adjustments seem more affected by the wage dynamic, as in the previous case, than by 
the balance of payments equilibrium constraint.  
 
In the short-run, for all labour market regimes, the rate of saving falls due to the rise in the 
trade and Government deficits. In fact, although investment is increasing this is unable to 
counterbalance the negative impact on internal and external balance. So, the intertemporal 
constraint makes households’ decisions part of the regional financial mechanism, though this 
does not seem realistic where regions do not possess fiscal autonomy.  
 
Table 2 indicates that, in the long-run, there is a bigger impact on real variables in the national 
than the regional configuration. Gross Regional Product is above its benchmark equilibrium 
by 2.06% in FL2 and 1.91% in FL1. Such differences are driven by consumption which is 
greater in FL2 (1.85%) than FL1 (1.48%). So the long-run difference between the two models 
is due substantially to consumption, which in turn is affected by total wealth.  
 
Wealth increases more in FL2 than in FL1. Wealth, in fact, is composed of NFW and FW. 
NFW is determined in the same way in both models but FW is the result of different 
specifications. In the national configuration, the increase in assets also raises total wealth, and 
consumption is positively affected. Consequently, household financial wealth increases as the 
value of the firm is above its benchmark equilibrium (1.97%), and the decrease in 
31 
 
Government debt (-1.54%) is not able to offset the fall in foreign debt (-2.77%). The change 
in total assets is positive (see Fig. 6a). This will affect consumption since, in the long-run, the 
instability between current wealth and consumption disappears.  
 
Surprisingly, the same type of adjustment is also obtained in the myopic counterpart of FL2. 
First, in the short-run, the rate of saving falls for the reason explained above and furthermore 
the long-run impact coincides with the forward looking model.  
 
From Figure 6, we see that in both models, savings fall in the initial periods and then rise. 
Financial Wealth rises immediately in the first period and then decreases (maintaining 
positive change) because foreign debt rises. As soon as the change in foreign debt became 
negative, the financial wealth curve rises gently tempered by the fall in Government assets 
held by households.  
 
This path analysis confirms that little differences in adjustment and impact exist between 
myopic and forward-looking models
15
. Previous literature has emphasised the incapacity of  
the myopic model to produce results that are consistent with rational behaviour (under perfect 
foresight). In these experiments instead we demonstrate that both models may reproduce 
similar behaviour for the main macroeconomic variables provided effort considerable effort is 
devoted to ensure that both models are otherwise comparable in structure.   
6.4. Sensitivity analysis.  
As we have seen above, the only difference between myopic and forward-looking models is in 
the transitional pathway towards a new steady state. In particular, due to the characteristics of 
both models, two parameters are able to govern and alter the speed of adjustment: the myopic 
                                                          
15
 We should say, however, that with supply-side shocks the adjustment path between myopic and forward 
looking can be dramatically different. Though, the long-run impact is the same.  
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model is highly sensitive to the parameter,  , in the investment equation, whilst the inverse of 
the constant elasticity of marginal utility,    , is the parameter that more than any other alters 
the rate at which the new steady state equilibrium is reached in the forward-looking model.  
 
In Figure 7 and 8 we show the differences of changing the parameters   and   in the myopic 
and forward looking models, respectively. As in the preceding simulations, we increase 
interregional exports by 10%. Increasing   the curve of the proportionate change in the 
accumulation rate tends to approach the stable point (zero change) rapidly. Given that capital 
stock accumulates over time due to past net investment, a positive shock produces a growth of 
GRP generating a large gap between desired and actual K. This causes current net investment 
to rise. This rise in investment will increase with the parameter  , thereby increasing the 
speed of adjustment of the accumulation rate.  
 
In Figure 8, we report the percentage change of consumption obtained by changing the value 
of  . Given an intertemporally additive utility function, the Euler equation for expected utility 
maximization under rational expectations implies that, by increasing the value of the marginal 
utility of consumption and keeping fixed the sacrifice of not consuming (the interest rate), the 
cost of reallocating consumption between the present and the future will decrease. So 
changing   , we modify the cost of reallocating consumption between periods that, according 
to the figures, imply that, for a positive shock, consumption will reach the new steady state 
faster when    is high or its inverse (   ) is low.  When    is equal to 0.5 and 0.4, 
consumption in the initial periods falls due to the fact that households prefer to save in these 
periods and allocate more consumption to future periods.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
Since regional CGE models are often based on a recursive dynamic structure, the lack of 
forward-looking expectations has been stressed as an important drawback of such models 
(Partridge and Rickman, 1998; 2011). The focus of this paper is to produce a simple stylized 
forward-looking model applicable in a regional context, given that the application of the usual 
mechanism and closures applied in national intertemporal CGE models would misrepresent 
the adjustment mechanisms that are likely to occur in a region.  
 
The main conclusion is that conventional intertemporal consumer optimization, based on 
neoclassical or Fisherian analysis of intertemporal resource allocation, seems to be 
inappropriate from a regional point of view. The consumer intertemporal maximization 
process not only yields the time path of consumption, but also the time path of savings which 
became a function of total financial assets. Thus, not only is the instability between current 
income and current consumption, related to the permanent income hypothesis approach, 
relevant here, but more emphasis is put on the dynamic path of savings where households are 
liable for all the financial needs of the region. In turn, this implies an imposed balance of 
payments adjustment mechanism. Furthermore, we question the plausibility, from a regional 
point of view, of the imposition of an intertemporal budget constraint where internal and 
external debts are made repayable from the private sector. No internal and external debt 
sustainability problems occur in a region. Deficit in the current account cannot be seen as 
hypothetical surplus in later periods making external debt repayable because there is no 
requirement to do so, and foreign debt, especially for declining regions, is the result of capital 
subvention supplied by supra-regional institutions, such as a national Government or the 
European Union. Regional public deficits are not a problem at all, given only that the national 
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government remains committed to the maintenance of the Union. It would, therefore, be a 
mistake to allow consumers to take the public deficit into account in their intertemporal 
optimization problem, as no taxes will be imposed to cover it and no change in consumption 
plans is required. As we noted above, regional policy is an exogenous variable for regions so 
no Ricardian equivalence of regional fiscal deficits applies.  
 
We have also argued that some of the objections to myopic models, such as the presumed lack 
of capital adjustment in the myopic model and differences in long-run steady state results 
between myopic and forward-looking models, cannot be correct. In some articles, forward-
looking models are compared with myopic specifications that preclude any adjustment in 
investment and consumption. The usual assumptions are passive investment (or investment 
held constant to the base year in real terms) and consumption simply obtained as a fixed share 
of current income. In this paper, myopic and forward-looking models that are genuinely 
comparable generate the same results in the long-run. The only difference, though of course it 
may be a significant one, is in the transitional pathway where consumption and investment 
might diverge: perfect foresight agents have rational expectations whilst myopic foresight 
agents take decisions according to adaptive expectations and so make no intertemporal 
preferences between periods on future profits and incomes. Furthermore, from the sensitivity 
analysis we show that the transitional path may be affected by the two types of adjustment 
parameters: the speed of adjustment parameter in the myopic model and the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in the forward-looking model. In the myopic model we have an 
adjustment equation in investment while in the forward looking model we have two equations 
which influence adjustment speed, one in investment and the other in consumption. The latter 
can be interpreted in fact as a flexible accelerator mechanism (like for investment) where the 
parameter that governs intertemporal preferences,    , can also be seen as an adjustment 
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parameter. This is the main structural difference between the myopic and forward looking 
models presented in this paper.  
 
It is crucial to appreciate that, independently of the dynamic structure of the model, in the 
long-run we obtain identical results for forward-looking and myopic models. This outcome is 
much more intuitive than the results obtained in some past studies where the two models’ 
results differed even in the long-run. Such differences have been attributed to the inability of 
the myopic model to produce outcomes consistent with fully rational behaviour due to the 
lack of perfect foresight. However, we have shown that comparable regional myopic and 
forward-looking CGE models produce equivalent results in the long-run and that the 
differences encountered in the past should be attributed to fundamental differences in model 
structure, specifically to differences in macroeconomic adjustment processes.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
The mathematical presentation of the model 
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In order to produce short-run results, we have that  
                (A.68) A 
           (A.69) A 
            
(A.70) A 
          
(A.71) A 
42 
 
For FL2 equation (A.33) disappear if dngins=h. We also add:  
 
 
 
   (    )           (∑     
 
       ) 
(A.72)  
 
In order to run the myopic model from the consumption side, equations (A.26) and (A.27) are substitute with the 
following: 
 
   ∑            
         〈 〉
 ∑            
         〈  〉
      
 ∑ ∑              
       
 
 
(A.73)  
To obtain the path of investment equations (A.46 – A.49) disappear and we introduce: 
       [     
       ]          (A.74)  
     
  ( (    )
     
  
     
    
)
 
    
      (A.75)  
Alternatively we can use the following: 
 
    
     
   [
     
    
]
 
 
(A.76)  
Where   equal 0.5 in (A.75) and 2 in (A.76) 
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Glossary 
 
i,j                      the set of goods or industries 
ins                                 the set of institutions 
dins (    )          the set of domestic institutions 
dngins (     )           the set of non-government institutions 
h (       )     the set of households 
 
Prices  
      output price 
      value added price 
      regional price 
      commodity price 
       national commodity price (regional + ROI) 
      ROI price  
      rate of return to capital 
   unified nominal wage 
  
  after tax wage 
    capital good price 
     user cost of capital 
     shadow price of capital 
    aggregate consumption price 
      aggregate price of Government consumption goods 
   exchange rate [fixed] 
  
Endogenous variables  
     total output 
     Regional supply 
     total import 
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     total export (interregional + international) 
     value added 
     labour demand 
     physical capital demand 
      capital stock 
      labour supply 
       Total intermediate inputs 
       regional intermediate inputs 
       ROW intermediate inputs 
        national intermediate inputs (REG+ROI) 
       ROI intermediate inputs 
       regional government expenditure 
       government expenditure( ROI+ROW) 
   aggregated household consumption 
        total households consumption in sector i for h  
         regional consumption in sector i for group h 
         import consumption in sector i for group h 
      total investment by sector of origin i 
       regional investment by sector of origin i 
       ROW investment demand 
        national investment (REG+ROI) 
       ROI investment demand 
     investment by sector of destination j 
     investment by destination j with adjustment cost 
   regional unemployment rate 
    
  marginal net revenue of capital 
            domestic non-government saving 
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            domestic non-government income 
                    transfer among dngins 
      total household tax 
    current account balance 
       production subsidies 
  
Exogenous variables  
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ̅ remittance for dngins 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   remittance for the Government 
      government expenditure  
      government saving 
   interest rate 
  
Elasticities  
  constant elasticity of marginal utility  
   between labour and capital in sector j 
  
  in Armington function 
  
  of export with respect to term of trade 
  of real wage with respect to unemployment rate  
  
Parameters  
    
  Input-output coefficients for i used in j 
  
  share of value added on production 
  
    shares in value added function in sector j 
    
             shares parameters in CES function for intermediate goods 
    
                 shares parameters in CES function for investment goods 
    
      shares parameters in CES function for households 
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consumption  
  
     shares parameters in CES function for government 
consumption  
    
       shift parameter in CES functions for intermediate goods 
  
  shift parameter in CES function for households consumption 
goods 
  
  shift parameter in CES function for government consumption  
      business tax 
     rate of production subsidy 
      rate of import tax 
      physical capital matrix 
          rate of saving in institutions dngins 
ssce rate of social security paid by employees 
sscer rate of social security paid by employer 
ire rate of income tax 
  pure rate of consumer time preference 
bb rate of distortion or incentive to investment 
  rate of depreciation 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. 
Intertemporal, Myopic and Regional Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intertemporal models Myopic models Regional Myopic 
models
(e.g. AMOS)
Regional forward 
looking model (aim 
of the paper)
Dynamic 
Structure
Forward Looking Recursive Recursive Forward Looking
Consumption Jump variable 
(derived from 
intertemporally additive 
utility function )
Abstracting from 
future periods 
(derived from a 
simple budget 
equation or as a 
fixed share of 
income)
Abstracting from 
future periods
(derived from a 
simple budget 
equation)
Jump variable
(derived from 
intertemporally
additive utility 
function) 
Saving rate Endogenous Exogenous Exogenous Exogenous
Investment Jump variable 
(Tobin’s q)
Usually passive 
(not determined 
independently of 
saving)
Independent of 
saving. 
Uzawa (1969) or 
Jorgenson (1963)
Jump variable 
(Tobin’s q)
Balance of 
payments 
(BOP)
BOP constraint, 
imposing financial 
sector equilibrium
Often BOP 
constraint through 
passive investment
No constraint No constraint
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Table 2 - Forward-Looking models. The short-run and long-run impact of 10% increase in interregional export 
under three different labour market closures and three types of financial sector adjustment. Percentage change 
with respect to the initial steady state. 
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Table 3 - Myopic models. The short-run and long-run impact of 10% increase in interregional export under 
three different labour market closures and three types of financial sector adjustment. Percentage change with 
respect to the initial steady. 
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Figure 1 
The production structure of the model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Gross Regional Product, Model FL1 
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Figure 3 
Consumer Price Index, Model FL1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  
Gross Regional Product: a comparison between  FL1 and MYP1 
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Figure 5 
Consumption and Investment under  Regional bargaining. Forward looking vs. 
Myopic model 
 
 
Figure 6 
Financial wealth and household savings 
 
a) Model FL2 
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b) Model MYP2 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Accumulation rate for different value of the speed of adjustment 
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Figure 8 
Consumption for different value of  
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